Penn State Law eLibrary
Masthead Logo
Journal Articles

Faculty Works

2019

Remarks on Prosecutorial Discretion and
Immigration
Shoba Wadhia
Penn State Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/fac_works
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shoba Wadhia, Remarks on Prosecutorial Discretion and Immigration, 123 Dickinson L.Rev. 7333 (2019).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK307.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

3-MAY-19

12:52

Transcript

Remarks on Prosecutorial Discretion
and Immigration
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia*
I realize I’m the second to the last panel before the end of the
day and reception, so I will do my best to keep you energized
around the topic of prosecutorial discretion and immigration.1 I
want to thank the Dickinson Law Review, Doris, Michael, and everyone who made this event possible. It’s really been seamless from
my vantage point, and I know that that involves a lot of behind-thescenes work.
I want to share a few preliminary notes, knowing that some of
this room may be more informed about discretion and the criminal
justice system as opposed to how it functions in the immigration
space. My disclaimer is that I am not a criminal law scholar, and so
I am really coming to you with this issue as an immigration scholar.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinetlevel agency in the executive branch. I will be using the word DHS
more than once in my remarks today, and it is units within DHS
that play the role of prosecutor in the immigration space.
* Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar, Clinical Professor of Law, Penn State Law;
Founder and Director, Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic.
1. This is a transcript of a presentation Professor Wadhia gave at the Dickinson Law Review’s Symposium on March 15, 2019. The transcript was lightly edited
by Professor Wadhia and Law Review staff to improve readability.
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In fact, there is more than one agency that has the
prosecutorial role. Those agencies include Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs Border Protection, and ICE or Immigration Customs Enforcement. In fact, all three of these agencies have
the authority to draw up and issue charging documents.2
Immigration is largely a civil system,3 but I don’t want to leave
you with the impression that it never commingles with the criminal
justice system. It is commingled in a few ways. For example, certain criminal conduct can have immigration consequences that are
priorities for DHS.
Second, there are certain actions or activities that are themselves federal crimes. Predominantly those include unlawful entry,
which is a misdemeanor, and unlawful reentry, which is a felony
crime. It is in my view an over-prosecuted crime in our criminal
justice system, and it also has severe immigration consequences.
When thinking about criminal prosecutorial discretion, we consider: do we need to file a reentry charge against somebody who
has a U.S. citizen family, who has roots in the United States, and
who is married to the same?
What is prosecutorial discretion in immigration law? It refers
to the choice, as I mentioned earlier, made by the agency—in this
case, the Department of Homeland Security—about whether to exercise the full scope or any part of immigration law against a person
or a group of persons.4
This type of prosecutorial discretion can be exercised invisibly,
right? It could be a choice I might make as an officer to not arrest
someone, to not interrogate someone, or to not put someone in jail.
But forms of discretion also operate affirmatively, like the choice to
grant a stay of deportation to someone who has been ordered removed or the choice to grant a form of prosecutorial discretion
known as deferred action.
We heard earlier that prosecutorial discretion is complicated
because of the good and bad and in between. But it’s also complicated in immigration because there is a menu of tools that consti2. See e.g., CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PENN STATE, THE DICKINSON
SCH. OF LAW, TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL: IMPROVING THE
GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2013), http://bit.ly/2Ul1bue
[https://perma.cc/25MY-ZSQC].
3. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE 2 (2013), http:/
/bit.ly/2Kxeo3a [https://perma.cc/2Z4U-DQRF] (“Since the late 1800s, the Supreme Court has maintained that deportation is a ‘civil’ rather than ‘criminal’ sanction . . . .”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
4. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 243–46 (2010).
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tute prosecutorial discretion. There are more than one dozen types
of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law.5
So, when can prosecutorial discretion be exercised? Like in
the criminal process and maybe even more, it could be exercised at
multiple stages of enforcement. That might include pre-interrogation, pre-arrest, detention before trial, after trial, or after an order
of removal has been entered. There are multiple stages during
which the prosecutor might exercise discretion, and the opportunities shrink once the person has been placed in removal proceedings
before a judge.
Why? Because the judges, who are employees of the Justice
Department, have full jurisdiction over an individual once that person can be placed in removal proceedings. That is one reason why
the prosecutorial opportunities shrink for the ICE attorney once a
person is in removal proceedings.
How do I come to this issue? Twenty years ago, I worked on
these cases and was fascinated by the power of prosecutorial discretion. Fascinated by this idea: that someone who is in my office, who
has no relief available to him or her under the immigration law,
who has compelling evidence, who has ties to the United States,
may be able to be here in what I call “immigration purgatory.”
You don’t pursue prosecutorial discretion when you have a client who is eligible for some more durable relief, like asylum or cancellation of removal. So, that’s another important piece. It’s the
stories of my own clients and this power that seems both invisible
and invincible that drew me to want to write and research about
this area for the last decade plus.
So, what is the theory of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law? One theory, which I would say is similar to the criminal
justice system, is economic. There are limited resources. One
guideline from 2011 teaches us that the government has resources
to deport about 400,000 or less than four percent of the 11.2 million
people living in the United States without papers,6 and I’m not even
including those green card holders who may also be deportable in
the United States.
Choices have to be made—who are you going to target for removal and who are you going to place on the back burner? Like
5. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Enforcement and the Future of Discretion, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 353, 354–55 (2018).
6. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
on Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention,
and Removal of Aliens 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), http://bit.ly/2P7G1yC [https://perma.cc/
URC4-4NUF].
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criminal prosecutors, they’re not going to prosecute everyone who
fishes without a license. Why? Because there are bigger fish to fry.
This concept really exists in immigration law too, pun intended.
This second dimension, which is a little bit broader or more
complex in contrast to the criminal system, for why we have
prosecutorial discretion in immigration is humanitarian. There has
long been an element of compassion and humanitarian factors that
drive who will be protected from enforcement or deportation as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion.
In one of my FOIA adventures that lasted years with many
agencies, I uncovered thousands of case files involving people who
had been treated favorably as a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
and the data was elusive at best, not only because of the shield held
over the data by our own government but also because the government did not track a lot of this information.7
In fact, in one FOIA request that ended up in a lawsuit with
ICE over data for deferred action, ICE stipulated that it never even
tracked deferred action cases before fiscal year 2012. This is quite
striking if you think about the fact that prosecutorial discretion operated in the immigration system for decades.
So, how do you really know that, Professor Wadhia? Well, I
know this in part because of the data and the years that are coded
along with the case files I received. But I also know it because of a
man named Leon Wildes who is the lawyer for the famous Beatle
John Lennon. In fact, you could even say that prosecutorial discretion in immigration law starts with the Beatles.
John Lennon was in deportation proceedings, and his lawyer
was sure that there was some type of policy known as deferred action, then called nonpriority status, that shielded people from deportation. The old INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
said: We don’t do that. That program doesn’t exist.
Mr. Wildes sued, and he was involved in a multi-year FOIA
lawsuit wanting data to use to advocate for his client John Lennon.
Eventually he uncovered 1,843 case files involving deferred action
cases, largely in the 1960s and 1970s. These were case files where
even individuals who had criminal histories, drug crimes, and so on,
were still treated favorably largely for humanitarian reasons.8
There was a time in immigration history when having a criminal
7. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 101, 109 n.35 (2015).
8. See Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information
Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 52 (1976).
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history was not fatal to getting a favorable grant of prosecutorial
discretion because of this humanitarian dimension.
Is prosecutorial discretion in immigration legal? That’s a question I get asked every other day. It is in part rooted in the U.S.
Constitution. We heard earlier about the Take Care clause. I read
the Take Care clause9 as translating to walking and chewing gum at
the same time, right? There is an obligation by the President to
enforce the laws of the United States, but to also use discretion. In
fact, the case, Heckler v. Cheyney,10 includes a passage about how
the symbol of the Take Care clause is really about enforcement and
discretion, and that principle really applies to the immigration
space.
I alluded earlier to a congressional delegation as well. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),11 which has been compared
second in complication to the U.S. Tax Code,12 is a beast and a
beast I fell in love with in law school and maybe some of you did
too.
Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act delegates
to the Secretary of Homeland Security the power and authorization
to enforce immigration and make choices about immigration.13 To
me, that is clear statutory authority for who has the authority to use
discretion as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
We also have other sections of the INA that talk about
prosecutorial discretion. Section 242(g) precludes judicial review
for three specific acts of prosecutorial discretion: the choice to start
proceedings, to adjudicate cases, or to execute removal orders.14
We have another statute that tells us that Congress must set
priorities, and I’ll talk about prioritization in a few minutes. There
are other legal authorities; let’s go to a Ronald Reagan-era regulation. At 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14), this is a regulatory section that
furnishes work authorization for certain people granted deferred
action if they can show economic necessity.15
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . .”).
10. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
12. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1–9834 (2018).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2018).
14. Id. § 1252(g).
15. See 8 C.F.R § 274a.12(c)(14) (2018) (“An alien who has been granted deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives
some cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment . . . .”).
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Deferred action, again, is part of our system for a very long
time, and the underlying regulation that gives the authority for
agencies to give a work permit to somebody granted deferred action is more than 30 years old. It also validates that deferred action
or prosecutorial discretion more broadly is a real thing.
The final legal authority I will identify is guidance documents,
because all of you administrative lawyers know that guidance documents sometimes operate as law. In fact, a lot of immigration law
relies and subsists on guidance documents.
There have been many administrations that have issued guidance documents on prosecutorial discretion policy. One of the
earliest documents was authored by the former INS Commissioner
Sam Bernsen in 1976. He laid out a multipage treatise on exactly
how prosecutorial discretion should be used and applied in immigration cases and in favor of exercising that discretion as early in
the process as possible.16
Now, fast forward to the year 2000; the former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner issued a prosecutorial discretion policy that
may be of a particular interest to this audience, or part of this audience, because she relied on criminal law principles. She actually
cited to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.17 She cited to the “substantial
federal interest standard,” and she made the case, and had the narrative, that like with criminal law, choices have to be made by immigration officers about who to target for enforcement and who to
treat favorable as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.18 That gave
you a flavor of how prosecutorial discretion was used in previous
administrations.
Let us fast forward to the time of Trump. What does
prosecutorial discretion look like in the time of Trump? On January 25, 2017, the Trump Administration, the White House specifically, issued two executive orders on immigration enforcement.
One dealing with enforcement on the interior.19 The second dealing with enforcement at the border.20
Within those documents, the Administration listed what the
priorities were. We need priorities, right? Because without the
16. See Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, Gen. Counsel, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., on Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion (July 15, 1976), http://bit.ly/2Ufj65c [https://perma.cc/Z5SN-MSJJ].
17. See Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 2 (Nov. 17, 2000), http://bit.ly/
2v3x5AY [https://perma.cc/ATH2-3GCW].
18. See id. at 4–10.
19. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
20. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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ability to set priorities, we can’t decide who is going to be targeted
for removal and who is going to be placed on the back burner. This
list includes some priorities similar to previous administrations, like
being convicted of a felony or being convicted of a criminal offense,
but it’s more expansive. It includes being convicted of any criminal
offense. It includes having a crime that is unresolved. It includes
committing acts that constitute a chargeable offense, also known as
jaywalking in some jurisdictions. I would say if I were to give you
the most novel change on the actual list of priorities by this Administration, it would include anybody who has a removal order.
The reason I want to single out this population is that there are
thousands of people living in the United States peacefully with old
removal orders with or without an old criminal history. They have
for over a decade plus built their lives in the United States. You
might be thinking: Wait a minute. Where were they all this time?
Why are they surfacing now as a priority?
Well, they were under a type of prosecutorial discretion. There
are many types of discretion that can be exercised once you’ve been
ordered removed. Three more known forms include an order of
supervision, deferred action, and a stay of deportation. In fact, the
first prosecutorial discretion case I handled over 20 years ago involved two individuals who had really compelling equities and who
were eventually able to get stays of deportation and orders of
supervision.
It is heartbreaking. Because if we tell the story of family separation, there are a lot of ways to tell that story, not just from the
footage we saw at the border over the summer21 but also with travel
bans separating families and also with people with removal orders
being targeted. If they are no longer protected under prosecutorial
discretion, they are literally being targeted and deported and separated from families that they have built largely here in the United
States.
My clinic was at a jail in Pennsylvania earlier this week meeting with somebody who is a green card holder, who has lived here
for over two decades, who has U.S. citizen kids, who suffered loss of
his own family members, a lot of compelling circumstances, and an
old removal order; they are now being targeted for deportation.
That was just a very local example of how people in our own community are being targeted.
21. See Editorial Bd., Opinion, The Continuing Tragedy of the Separated Children, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2MEi1Ff [https://perma.cc/F7YJNZ47].

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK307.txt

740

unknown

Seq: 8

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

3-MAY-19

12:52

[Vol. 123:733

Other ways that the Trump Administration has changed
prosecutorial discretion, or modified it, is by deleting certain previous guidance documents. A very breathtaking line in the executive
order by the Trump Administration and the implementing guidance
is that all existing conflicting guidance, memoranda, and policy are
hereby rescinded.22 By doing that, what was removed were all of
the humanitarian factors listed in the previous guidance documents
about how to handle prosecutorial discretion, and other instances
where favorable humanitarian-based prosecutorial discretion was
alive.
Another piece we need to look at when we think about
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is location. Where does
enforcement happen? The choice to not enforce immigration law
in a certain physical area, for example, is a prosecutorial discretion
decision. Existing guidance teaches us that immigration should not
enforce immigration law as a general matter in sensitive locations.
This would include schools, places of worship, and hospitals. That
policy, which is still in theory on paper, is a prosecutorial discretion
policy in a sense. We can broaden that conversation about physical
locations, right? You think about the increase in workplace raids
and other enforcement actions in the United States under this
Administration.
I want to say enforcement actions are not new to this Administration. In fact, we had a large-scale enforcement action in State
College, Pennsylvania in 2014 on several restaurants. But I think
what’s different, at least from my vantage point, is the publicity
that’s being given to these enforcement actions without any consideration of some of the collateral factors, like the individuals who
are deported or to the humanitarian factors.
Even with the George W. Bush Administration, I was in D.C.
working as a lobbyist at the time. We had very intentional conversations about the humanitarian factors that should be considered
during and after an enforcement action so that individuals with
compelling equities would be treated favorably.
I cannot end this talk without talking about DACA.23 I mentioned it a little based on a question from one of you on sharing
22. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“The
Secretary shall review agency regulations, policies, and procedures for consistency
with this order and, if required, publish for notice and comment proposed regulations rescinding or revising any regulations inconsistent with this order . . . .”).
23. “DACA” refers to one of the Obama Administration’s “deferred action”
programs: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. See Memorandum from Janet
Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
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information and maybe where that information goes.24 DACA is
really an illustration of a larger prosecutorial discretion policy. It
has been a gateway for about 800,000 people in the United States,
roughly 6,000 people in the state of Pennsylvania. Many even attend our Penn State and Commonwealth campuses. Many DACA
recipients attend or have attended law schools across the United
States.
DACA recipients are really in some ways an American success
story. They have contributed extraordinarily to the educational
space, to the economic space. Yet on September 5, 2017, the former Attorney General announced that DACA would end.25 He
called DACA recipients “illegal aliens.”26 He called the policy itself
extra statutory and unconstitutional. In my view, his speech was
dehumanizing and also erroneous about immigration law and the
authority for a policy like DACA.
In full disclosure, I’ve led quite a few efforts on behalf of legal
scholars, in briefs, and as an expert witness in the litigation surrounding DACA.
The courts, at least so far, seem to have agreed that the choice
to end DACA was a mistake of law, as a matter of administrative
law. The reason why you see a little bit of a revival, at least for
people who already have DACA status and who are continuing to
be able to renew their DACA status, is because of litigation. Litigation saying that “DHS, you can give me a reason but the reason
you’re giving me is arbitrary and the choice that you use and the
basis you gave to end the DACA policy was a mistake of law.”
That’s sort of what is keeping DACA alive now but still giving so
much uncertainty to the DACA population.
A lesser-known prosecutorial discretion policy I want to mention, since the end is imminent, is something called “DED” or Deferred Enforced Departure. This is a policy that is inherent in the
President’s authority.27 You won’t see it in any written form. There
is no statutory basis for it, and it is usually country specific, based
on the conditions of that particular country.
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15,
2012), https://bit.ly/2meSuUv [https://perma.cc/7D9C-JETP].
24. Professor Wadhia is referring to a question asked during an earlier panel
discussion.
25. See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End
DACA and Calls on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://nyti.ms/
2eAVjdL [https://perma.cc/HSE8-UZPR].
26. Id.
27. See Deferred Enforced Departure, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://bit.ly/2IifdUD [https://perma.cc/9N6J-BQYV].
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Currently Liberia nationals are the only population that have
DED. DED’s end was announced last year, and the expiration date
is March 31, 2019.28 I want to stress the fact that any Liberian DED
holder has been living in the United States for decades. Many have
U.S. citizen children as well as parents who might also have DED.
So where do we go from here? First, we need real priorities.
We need those priorities to be followed. My own view is that a
criminal history alone should never be fatal to a prosecutorial discretion grant. I have long argued, long before the Obama Administration, that the humanitarian component of prosecutorial
discretion must always inform who we are going to target during
enforcement and who we are going to place on the back burner.
Sometimes I’ll get asked, Well, what about legislation? Don’t
we just need comprehensive immigration reform? Isn’t that why
we’re in the middle of this huge humanitarian crisis? That might be
part of the puzzle, right? We have a good number of people who
have been in the United States for a long time. In fact, two-thirds
of the undocumented population living in the United States has
been here for over a decade. It’s a long period of time and for
many they built up equities while in the United States, and so they
might identify as Americans too.
I think for a segment of the undocumented population, legislative reform is the way to go. But we will always need prosecutorial
discretion. Even with comprehensive immigration reform, people
will fall through the cracks. There will be unintended consequences. No legislative reform is going to create a silver bullet for
every single person who shouldn’t be deported or deserves to be
protected if only temporarily.
So, I’m going to end there. I hope I kept you awake, and I
look forward to your questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: How did it go from a discretionary
question to basically an error of law with respect to DACA? I can
see arguing a case as a use of discretion. But how did it work more
into an error of law?
PROFESSOR WADHIA: That’s a great question. Because
the trigger for creating DACA is an apple and the outcome from
the litigation is an orange.
28. See Memorandum on Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians, 2016
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641 (Sept. 28, 2016). On March 28, 2019, the Trump
Administration extended the “wind down’ period for DED by 12 months. See
Memorandum on Extension of Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians, 2019
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 185 (Mar. 28, 2019).
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Let’s talk about the apple. The apple is we have this long history of discretion and there is evidence to show that people who
have equities, like coming to the United States at a young age, living here, thriving and being educated, are some of the factors that
we might use to grant discretion favorably.
So, DACA is announced. It is 100 percent a prosecutorial discretion policy. It does not result in any type of legal status, and it’s
not a statute. It does not create an independent pathway to a green
card. How it ended up being revived under a different legal principle is based on the explanation given by the Administration for why
it was ending DACA.
The explanation given by the Administration was not, We don’t
like this policy, and we just want to get rid of it, or—I don’t agree
with this position—We want to prioritize people who have DACA
for enforcement because they’re low-hanging fruit and they don’t
have an immigration status.
The Administration took the route of saying DACA was unlawful, that it violated the statute. It did a run around Congress,
and it violated the Constitution. Period. No explanation, no discussion. At the other end, 105 immigration scholars have said, Here
are all the legal authorities that give a basis for DACA.29
My view is they were really stuck on calling DACA a mistake
of law and so the courts turned around and said, Your explanation
is arbitrary; you didn’t give us a real reason, and the reason itself was
a mistake of law. So, the APA actually ended up being the baseline
for reviving DACA.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: Does prosecutorial discretion have
any role to play in asylum applications?
PROFESSOR WADHIA: Another great question. One preliminary point I was going to make at the beginning is that discretion with a capital “D” is a very big world in immigration law and
maybe in other law spaces too. This entire time we’ve only been
talking about prosecutorial discretion. But discretion is exercised in
so many different ways via statute and immigration law.
Asylum is rooted in the immigration statute, and that code that
I said was second in complication to the U.S. Tax Code actually has
explicit language that was codified in 1980 with the Refugee Act30
that says that any person could apply for asylum and could physi29. See Letter from 105 Immigration Scholars to President Donald J. Trump
(Aug. 14, 2017), http://bit.ly/2KEXTlM [https://perma.cc/X9DT-SVWP].
30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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cally come to the United States regardless of how they entered.
That is why you have this whole debacle with asylum, turning away
people who are apprehended in between ports of entry as opposed
to presenting themselves at the port of entry.
The statute, in my opinion, is crystal clear that both groups
have the ability to apply for asylum. Now, I have to show a few
things in order to qualify. I have to meet the legal definition of a
refugee, which is defined as somebody who has suffered persecution or faces persecution in the future because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in the social world.31
Still, no discretion; we’re just looking at elements that have to be
met as a matter of law.
The language of the statute does say that the Attorney General
may grant asylum. So, in that sense, it’s not prosecutorial discretion, but there is a discretionary component to asylum. Meaning, it
is possible for someone to meet all the qualifications for asylum but
still be denied, as a matter of discretion, under the statute.
The caselaw teaches us that this happens pretty rarely because
the seminal caselaw teaches us that, as a matter of law, all but the
most adverse factors should be outweighed by the persecution or
harm this person faces in the future. We have a very enlightened
interpretation of discretion in the asylum space.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: If you’re denied asylum, then
you’re subject to removal.
PROFESSOR WADHIA: If you are denied asylum, a couple
of things can happen. There are other types of remedies available
which might be a little beyond the scope of this topic, but there are
some other statutory remedies to be overturned that are
mandatory. Depending on the level of fear you have or the level of
harm you would suffer in your own country, you may still have
some type of durable relief.
But to the question of prosecutorial discretion, I think that
somebody who has a weak or a semi-strong asylum case but is ultimately denied should not be the first person we choose to deport,
right? A number of things could happen that way. For instance,
what if an immigration judge grants someone asylum? The ICE attorney can choose not to appeal, right?
The choice not to appeal a positive asylum grant is actually a
form of prosecutorial discretion. It’s another way we can think of
the different ways prosecutorial discretion can be used in different
stages of the process.
31. See U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: You have given a couple of examples that us newbies outside this area of law hear a lot. You hear
about someone who has been here for decades. They have citizen
children. They have ties to the community. They’re actively contributing, but they have some negative immigration status.
What does it take to get that person to become a citizen? Is
there something legally in the way? If they came forward and applied for citizenship, is ICE going to show up at their front door and
drag them out?
PROFESSOR WADHIA: Thank you for that question. There
is a lot packed up in that question. For some number of people who
have lived in the United States for a decade or more who have U.S.
citizen children, they’re not necessarily going to be eligible for citizenship today or for a very long time.
It is a myth that if you have a U.S. citizen child, you too can
become a citizen. Well, maybe that will happen, but that citizen
child has to be 21 years old before having the ability to sponsor the
parent.
Babies are not sponsoring their parents for a green card. And
you have to first have a green card, usually for at least five years,
before you can apply for citizenship. So, let’s say someone has been
sponsored by their 21-plus-years-old U.S. citizen child. Maybe
they’re 50 or 60 now, and then they have no criminal history that
would make them inadmissible, and they eventually are able to get
a green card.
Five years later, whether to apply for citizenship will be determinant on whether they can afford to pay for the prohibitive cost of
applying, whether they have any type of other history that they are
unaware of or that was not identified earlier by immigration, and/or
whether they are from a country where they feel a type of loyalty,
or there is a rule where they must renounce their citizenship there.
In terms of what’s available, by and large, there is not a lot
available under the existing legal framework in contrast to the
growing number of people who live in the United States without
status who have all of these equities. There is one remedy called
“cancellation of removal” which applies to people who are not
green card holders, who can show ten years physical presence, who
have no criminal history, and can show exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to a U.S. citizen or green card holder’s spouse,
parent, or child upon removal.
That exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard is
exceptional and extremely unusual. There are 4,000 grants like that
available each year. So, if you think about the millions more of
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people who we might want to protect, that’s what we have to have
a conversation about: legislative reform.
What a legislative solutions looks like is beyond the scope of
my remarks, but one point is clear: Prosecutorial discretion does
and will continue to play an important role in our immigration system. How that discretion is exercised matters.

